Teva: Representative call rates and bonus-linked activity targets (AUTH/2065/11/07 & AUTH/2066/11/07)

📅 8 March 2026 | 🖉 Anzal Qurbain
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Key facts

Case numberAUTH/2065/11/07 and AUTH/2066/11/07
Case referenceAnonymous Representatives v Teva
ComplainantTwo anonymous Teva representatives (non-contactable)
Respondent/companyTeva UK Ltd
Product(s)Not stated
Material/channelSales force mandates/briefing documentation; activity graphs/reports; incentive scheme linked to activity and diary appointments
Key issueWhether activity targets/bonus-linked call expectations and unclear guidance on “call rate” vs “contact rate” indirectly pressured representatives and advocated activity likely to breach the Code
Dates (received/completed if stated)Complaints received: 15 November 2007 (AUTH/2065/11/07) and 16 November 2007 (AUTH/2066/11/07); Cases completed: 11 February 2008
AppealNot stated
Code yearNot stated
Breaches/clausesBreach: Clause 15.9. No breach: Clauses 2, 9.1, 15.4.
SanctionsNo explicit additional sanctions stated beyond the required undertaking/corrective actions described in the report

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Reviewed by Dr Anzal Qurbain (FFPM) — ABPI Final Signatory

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What happened

  • Two anonymous Teva UK Ltd representatives (non-contactable) complained separately about representative call rates and related activity targets.
  • One complainant alleged that since early 2007 senior managers set excessive activity targets for calls on GPs, practice nurses and hospital doctors, and that targets could only be achieved by breaching the Code.
  • It was alleged that part way through quarter three 2007, bonus payments were linked to activity rates and to having at least 30 appointments in the diary over the following four months.
  • The complainant described access constraints on their territory (some surgeries did not see representatives; some granted only one appointment per year), and alleged this drove pressure to make more calls on other customers; they also alleged some people were lying about appointments to obtain bonuses.
  • The second complainant alleged undue pressure to achieve unfair/unjust call rates, with bonus payments linked to call rates and diary appointments; failure to hit numbers led to non-payment of bonus, and the complainant feared indirect pressure to breach the Code.
  • The Authority asked Teva to respond in relation to Clauses 2, 9.1, 15.4 and 15.9.
  • Teva stated it used key performance indicators and had an open-door policy and an internal complaints procedure; it provided a definition of “contact rate” and argued its mandates referenced the Code and that it was not breaching the “three unsolicited calls” guidance.
  • The Panel reviewed Teva’s mandates and graphs and considered that briefing material should clearly distinguish between expected call rates and expected contact rates; it found the documentation and submissions inconsistent/confusing (including graphs labelled “call frequency” being described as “contact rate”).
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Outcome

  • The Panel ruled a breach of Clause 15.9 because instructions/briefing to representatives were not sufficiently clear about the differences between call rates and contact rates and, without further explanation, advocated a course of action likely to breach the Code.
  • No breach of Clause 15.4 was ruled because, although the graphs were confusing, the Panel decided they did not provide evidence that over-calling had occurred.
  • No breach of Clauses 2 or 9.1 was ruled.
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